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The spread of the ecosystem services framework has been accompanied by the promotion of market-
based policy instruments for environmental governance. In this paper we clarify the rationale, policy
goals and governance challenges of the ecosystem services framework. After systematizing the
limitations of market-based policy tools for enhancing the provision of ecosystem services, we argue
that hybrid regimes are more suitable (compared to pure markets or hierarchies) to deal with the
governance challenges derived from the characteristics of ecosystem services, particularly their
common good character and their intrinsic complexity. The paper pleads for an alternative conceptual
underpinning of market-based instruments, in order to make them more compatible with hybrid forms
of governance. We discuss the major implications of such analytical shift.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Despite inherent problems in measuring natural capital and
assigning a monetary value to biological diversity and the services
we may derive from it, the promotion and use of ‘green markets’
have expanded recently, as a policy response to the ecological crisis.
The emerging vision that conserving nature enhances human well-
being (MA, 2005), helps reduce poverty (Sachs et al., 2009), and
promotes resilience in the face of climate change (Chapin et al., 2009)
has led to new international initiatives such as the ‘‘The Economics of
Ecosystems and Biodiversity Report’’ (Kumar, 2010) and the creation
of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES). As a result, the interest in market-based policy
instruments (such as payments for ecosystem services, carbon or
biodiversity offsets, wetlands banking or certiﬁcation schemes) has
spread very quickly. There is considerable debate as to whether these
mechanisms amount to a particularly reductionist form of free
market fundamentalism, and whether they are causing the unneces-
sary commoditization of ecosystem services (Go´mez-Baggethun andlsevier B.V.
originally developed in the
oming book ‘‘Governing the
hors and to be published by
x: þ44 1865281807.
adian),
Open access under CC BY-NCRuiz-Perez, 2011; Arsel and Buscher, 2012; McAfee, 2012). The latter
refers to the incorporation into a trading system of the ecosystem
services that hitherto were outside the market domain. It is worth
noting, however, that though in a matter of few years market-
oriented tools have gained considerable leverage in the environ-
mental policy agenda worldwide, market approaches are still
far from being the dominant policy strategies for environmental
protection and biodiversity conservation.
In practice, environmental governance is implemented
through a wide variety of models and instruments. More often
than expected, the management of natural resources depends on
a combination of governmental command-and-control, market
tools and community-based institutional arrangements. We argue
that such hybrid regimes are more suitable (compared to pure
markets or hierarchies) to deal with the governance challenges
derived from the characteristics of ecosystem services (particu-
larly their common good character and their intrinsic complex-
ity). The paper is structured as follows. The rest of this section
clariﬁes the rationale, policy goals and governance challenges of
the ecosystem services framework. Section 2 systematizes the
main limitations of market-based policy instruments when they
are used to ﬁll the governance gaps arising from the need to
manage the provision of ecosystem services. Section 3 calls for an
alternative conceptual underpinning of market-based instru-
ments that would allow them to be more compatible with hybrid
forms of governance. This is further elaborated in Section 4,
which addresses the speciﬁc issue of monetary incentives for-ND license.
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the major implications of the proposed analytical shift, and puts
forward a number of proposals for the governance of ecosystem
services.
1.1. The rationale, policy goals and governance challenges of the
ecosystem services framework
The use of ‘‘ecosystem services’’ as a key concept for describing
the relationship between human societies and the natural envir-
onment is historically very recent (Go´mez-Baggethun et al.,
2010). Since its introduction, the concept has nonetheless spread
rapidly and it has become both a heuristic analytical tool for
academics and a powerful discursive tool for conservation practi-
tioners and policy-makers interested in the preservation of
nature’s legacy (Noss and Cooperrider, 1994). The concept is
expected to induce a paradigm shift in the management of natural
resources (Cowx and Portocarrero-Aya, 2011) and to expand the
audience for the conservation message by means of showing the
links between natural systems and human well-being (Amsworth
et al., 2007; Skroch. and Lopez-Hoffman, 2009). The emphasis put
on the economic beneﬁts humans derive from ecosystems and on
the role that humans and local social institutions play in both the
provision and the degradation of these services is explicitly
utilitarian (Go´mez-Baggethun and Kelemens, 2008). It stands in
stark contrast to the paradigm that previously dominated the
ﬁeld of environmental conservation, with its stress on human/
nature dualism, trade-offs between economic development and
the conservation of natural ecosystems, and the need to create
protected areas free of all human activity (Sunderland et al.,
2008). The new framework is expected to facilitate the creation of
novel partnerships, particularly between civil society organiza-
tions, local dwellers and corporate entities (Tallis et al., 2009) and,
therefore, to mobilize additional human and ﬁnancial resources
for the conservation of natural ecosystems. We identify below
some key features of the ecosystem services framework and its
associated policy agenda.
The ecosystem services framework aims to: (1) acknowledge
and communicate the dependency of economic processes on
ecosystem functions through quantiﬁed measurements, among
others; (2) make explicit the linkages between different stake-
holders, in particular the users of the resource base (on which the
provision of ecosystem services rely) and the beneﬁciaries of the
ecosystem services. In order to achieve these broad objectives, the
ecosystem services approach typically ‘‘compartmentalizes’’ eco-
system services following a classiﬁcation of values (provisioning,
regulating, cultural etc.) and the type of contribution made to
economic processes (such as carbon sequestration or water
regulation). Such classiﬁcation was consolidated in the Millen-
nium Ecosystem Assessment. It has since been further elaborated
by different authors (Wallace, 2007; Costanza, 2008; Fisher and
Turner, 2008; Farley and Costanza, 2010). Their varied ways of
classifying and compartmentalizing services according to eco-
nomic uses (with or without market transactions), however,
reveal the same utilitarian approach towards the contribution of
natural systems to the economy, as well as a primary concern
with identifying beneﬁciaries and potential economic transac-
tions enabled by ecosystem services.
From a policy perspective, the ecosystem services approach is
meant to achieve two critical goals: (1) to help solve the tension
between economic development and environmental conservation;
(2) to inﬂuence the decisions made by the users of a resource base,
so that they align their practices with the interests of the
beneﬁciaries of ecosystem services. These two goals constitute
the core of the governance agenda that comes associated with the
ecosystem services approach. This agenda corresponds to twodistinctive areas of action, that of (a) creating linkages between
different layers and stakeholders in order to deal with complex
economic, social and ecological inter-dependencies, and that of
(b) inducing changes in the use or the property rights of the
resource base that provides the concerned services, so as to align
the interests of different social agents.
Although not necessarily inherent to the ecosystem services
framework, this governance agenda has come along with two
associated measures, (1) the economic valuation of these services,
and (2) the promotion—and increasing use—of market-based
policy tools, especially the so-called ‘‘payments for ecosystem
services’’. The goal is to convert hypothetical (and unrecognized)
market values into actual cash ﬂows (Go´mez-Baggethun and
Ruiz-Perez, 2011). Market-oriented policy approaches are not
inevitably linked to the ecosystem services framework. However,
two important components of the framework have facilitated the
adoption of this type of policy instrument. One the one hand, and
given that identiﬁcation of a tradable ‘‘commodity’’ is a pre-
requisite for the implementation of market-oriented instruments,
the compartmentalization of services has enabled their commo-
ditization. On the other hand, the need to create linkages between
various levels and between stakeholders with differing interests
has resulted in changes in property or use rights among the users
of the resource base.
Panayotou (1993) was one of the ﬁrst authors to argue
systematically that states on their own are not the appropriate
agents for environmental decision-making, and that traditional
governmental policy-making should leave much more room to
self-organization. He argued that government policies, rather
than correcting failures in markets for natural resources, tend to
add distortions, whether through taxes, subsidies, quotas, regula-
tions, inefﬁcient state enterprises, or public projects with low
economic return and high environmental impacts (Panayotou,
1993: 58–59). He added that ‘the role of the state in the struggle
for sustainable development is critical and fundamental but it is
not one of direct management or command and control. The state
role is rather to establish new rules of the game and create an
environment that fosters competition, efﬁciency and conserva-
tion’ (Panayotou, 1993: 144). He therefore called for policy
reforms which would ensure that the state would remove the
distortions that it had introduced in the ﬁrst place. The role of the
state, as he saw it, should be of creating market conditions for
environmental resources and services, which, by not being
brought within the present conﬁguration of markets, were being
undervalued and depleted.
In principle, monetary transfers seem appropriate tools for
both establishing links between social groups and negotiating
changes in rights over resources, either through trade or incen-
tives. The promotion and use of market-based policy instruments
in the governance of ecosystem services may open new opportu-
nities, but it also entails some threats and challenges, the most
important of which we outline below.2. The challenges of market-based instruments for governing
ecosystem services
2.1. The risks of reducing complexity
The compartmentalization and commoditization of ecosystem
services involve a substantial reduction of complexity. Character-
istically, the application of market-based mechanism requires
simple and straight-forward assumptions about the relationship
between land use, ecological functions and ecosystem services.
Any policy process necessarily entails a reduction of complexity,
since political decisions typically require a simpliﬁed setting.
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an oversimpliﬁcation might involve considerable risks since
ecosystem functions are intrinsically complex, due to the multi-
dimensional, non-linear and multi-scale (both geographical and
temporal) nature of ecological dynamics (Wilson, 2006). The
inability to address these complexities might undermine the
capacity to manage ecosystem functions effectively. The capacity
of ecosystems to deliver a variety of services depends on a
particular combination of features and properties, including
biomass and the composition of species and ecological functional
groups. These complexities (that markets are usually unable to
grasp) have been the subject of ecological research for decades.
Nonetheless, despite the ecological knowledge gained our under-
standing of ecosystem functions, including their drivers and
trade-offs, is still very limited.
The intrinsic complexity of ecological functions, and the
associated cost of gathering information about the relationship
between ecosystem functions, services and human welfare, is part
of the explanation as to why we miss empirical evidence about
the link between conservation interventions and the status of
ecosystem services. The lack of data about the effects of inter-
ventions on the provision of ecosystem services is pervasive
(Brouwer et al., 2011; Farley et al., 2011). Such a gap has led
Tallis and co-authors to conclude that ‘‘most of the current
enthusiasm for ecosystem service projects in the conservation
world is an act of faith’’ (Tallis et al., 2008: 9464). Ecologists and
other natural scientists are currently devoting considerable
efforts to understand the relationship between ecosystem func-
tions and services. However, this relationship is very context-
dependent, not only because of variations in the characteristics of
the resource base, but also due to variability in the local socio-
economic context and adaptation capacities of the concerned
social groups. This makes generalizations difﬁcult and informa-
tion gathering costly.
The ﬁnancial crisis triggered by the collapse of the subprime
mortgages has shown all too well how and why markets are
normally unable to regulate the provision of very complex
commodities (in this case complex ﬁnancial assets) when buyers
are not able to evaluate by themselves key attributes of the traded
commodities (in the case of the subprime mortgages their
composition and risk). In addition, due to a short-term time
horizon and lack of coordination, market agents typically have
difﬁculties in dealing with non-linear dynamics (such as feed-
backs, loops and thresholds). The risk entailed in high information
asymmetry might be also high when market-based mechanisms
are applied to the management of complex ecosystem functions.
Actually, most payments schemes for ecosystem services in
watersheds lack rigorous information about the eco-hydrological
effects of the proposed land used changes (Brouwer et al., 2011)
and many are based on assumptions that contradict the empirical
hydro-ecological evidence, for instance about the relationship
between forest cover and water provision (Bruijnzeel, 2004). In
a context of high uncertainty, the commoditization of ecosystem
services might actually reduce the possibilities of adaptive man-
agement (due to a loss of ﬂexibility induced by the need to trade a
particular commodity) and promote management practices based
on oversimpliﬁed (or misleading) assumptions about the relation-
ship between land use, ecosystem functions and services.
From the point of view of adaptive ecosystem management
based on the application of ecological knowledge, the compart-
mentalization of services is probably the main caveat of the
ecosystem services approach. A narrow division of ecosystem
services is exacerbated by the use of market-based instruments
for environmental governance, since markets are usually myopic to
ecological dynamics, that is, as argued before, unable to grasp their
inherent complexity. There is also a mismatch between thetimeframe of markets and ecosystem functions, which renders
the commoditization of ecosystem services difﬁcult. Disruption of
ecosystem functions due to human interventions might take long
periods of time. For instance, extinctions cascades and the related
regime shifts (involving major changes in the provision of ecosys-
tem services) are often not observed right away but after relative
long periods of time, when top predators have disappeared (Estes
et al., 2011). The proximity of such alternative states might be
difﬁcult to detect by short-sight economic dynamics.
2.2. Trade-offs between ecosystem services
The commoditization of ecosystem services usually entails the
identiﬁcation and commercialization of single services. The main
reason invoked for such a practice is that markets are normally
unable to deal with multiple services at the same time, since the
demand might be dispersed geographically or simply not avail-
able for some of the concerned services. Moreover, markets for
multiple services might involve considerable transaction costs.
However, the focus on single services might be problematic due
to the existence of trade-offs. Trade-offs between the provision of
different ecosystem services are very common and amply
reported (Rodriguez et al., 2006). This is the case, for instance,
for carbon sequestration and water provision (Jackson et al.,
2005), as well as for carbon sequestration and biodiversity
(Kanowski and Catterall, 2010). An over-emphasis on the com-
moditization and trade of a particular ecosystem service (such as
carbon sequestration) may induce changes in the structure and
functioning of the resource base that may in turn jeopardize the
supply of other services, and even the service whose provision is
being promoted. Thus, the fact that markets tend to be concen-
trated on few services may affect negatively the resilience of
ecosystems. For instance, large-scale carbon accumulation in
forests might favour disruptive ﬁres (Holling, 2010). These ﬁres
then may eventually undermine the capacity of forests to provide
a variety of ecosystem services, including carbon sequestration.
Moreover, the current ‘‘obsession’’ with carbon puts non-forested
ecosystems at risk. It may also jeopardize the complex and not yet
well-understood structure of tropical and other types of forests,
since, in forests managed for carbon, most species are viewed as
superﬂuous (Putz and Redford, 2009).
The current ‘‘carbon obsession’’ of the international environ-
mental agenda creates strong biases for valuing forests and other
ecosystems mainly for their ability to sequester carbon. Besides
the fact that valuing tropical forests based on the tons of carbon
they store or sequester is a very extreme simpliﬁcation from an
ecological and social point of view, it is also questionable that
market values (from carbon) could save the most threatened
ecosystems. If the regulatory framework for the development of
international markets (through REDDþ and other initiatives)
prospers, a likely scenario is that the price for a unit of carbon
will be low, since the global supply of carbon from forests or other
ecosystems is potentially huge and—at least according to current
trends in global negotiations—the commitments for reducing
emissions will not be substantial. Nonetheless, the pressures
and opportunity costs of ecosystem degradation will be rising,
due to the global boom in the demand and price of commodities,
and the concomitant incentives for the expansion of the agricul-
tural and resource extraction frontiers. Although the carbon
economy and the associated policy agenda are mobilizing new
resources for the protection of natural ecosystems, it does not
seem realistic to think that the emerging global carbon market
will contribute signiﬁcantly to countervail major land use
changes associated with the rapidly expanding demand for
agricultural and non-renewable natural resources at the
global level.
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The commoditization of ecosystem services requires a high
level of understanding and predictability of the relationship
between the practices of resource use, ecosystem functioning
and the provision of ecosystem services. Markets tend to be more
efﬁcient when there is full information about the traded goods or
services and when such information is shared by all the parties.
However, in the case of markets for ecosystem services, this
information is, in many cases, costly to obtain. As a result, there is
often a trade-off between the intention to establish markets for
well-deﬁned ecosystem services (which involves clearly identify-
ing what is being ‘‘traded’’ as well as verifying that the services
are actually delivered) and the transaction costs of setting them
up (Muradian et al., 2010). More often than not, this makes the
full commoditization of ecosystem services very difﬁcult or
unfeasible in practice.
The payments for ecosystem services implemented at the
national level in Costa Rica, arguably the world’s best known
PES scheme, has been reported to render a low level of environ-
mental additionality, namely a little effect on preventing defor-
estation (Sierra and Russman, 2006; Sanchez-Azofeifa et al.,
2007). This is likely the result of large information asymmetries.
The Costa Rican government does not know whether the provided
monetary transfers inﬂuence the behaviour of recipients, and the
cost of gathering such information is prohibitively high. This
could be considered as an example of how monetary transfers
with imperfect information may lead to ineffective outcomes.
2.4. The limits of the marginalist approach for acknowledging the
services of nature
The assumption that a generalized compensation for the
provision of ecosystem services—that is, the internalization of
their positive externalities—will lead to a more efﬁcient provision
of such services is structurally defective. The resolution of
environmental externalities through Coasean transactions might
be effective at the margins. That is, for transactions involving
marginal changes and particular situations. However, due to the
current pervasive use by economic actors of ecosystem services
that are not incorporated into markets, the scale of positive
externalities from natural ecosystems is immense; one might
therefore argue that the current planetary economic system is
viable only because of the huge ‘‘free-of-charge’’ beneﬁts humans
derive from natural ecosystems. This is supported by the results
of most studies dealing with the economic valuation or biodiver-
sity and ecosystem services (Kumar, 2010). This has been used as
an argument for pleading for the internalization of these extern-
alities into the economic systems. However, a generalized inter-
nalization of these positive externalities would be so costly that it
would lead to economic collapse. Policy makers considering
economic compensation for ecosystem services (i.e., their inter-
nalization) must be aware that this is only possible at the margin
of the provision of these services. To sum up, there are serious
limits to the possibilities of generalization and up-scaling.
2.5. The governance challenge of common pool and public goods
The need for coordination between different social actors for
the governance of ecosystem services comes from the fact that
though ownership of the resource base might be of any kind
(private, public, or communal), most ecosystem services fall
within the types of goods that are considered either ‘‘common-
pool resources’’ or ‘‘public goods’’. The former term refers to
goods (i.e. services) with two particular features: potential ben-
eﬁciaries cannot easily be excluded and there is a highsubtractability of use; and the latter concept refers to goods with
high difﬁculty in excluding beneﬁciaries but low substractability
(Ostrom, 2010). In other words, it is typically difﬁcult to exclude
beneﬁciaries of ecosystem services, as these services often cover a
wide geographical range. When potential beneﬁciaries are difﬁ-
cult to exclude, free-riding and opportunistic behaviour is likely
to emerge, and voluntary coordination mechanisms (such as
markets) tend to be less effective.
By causing changes in the supply of ecosystem services, the
subtraction of resources and land use changes carried out by the
users of the resource base may either enhance or undermine the
welfare of beneﬁciaries, creating by deﬁnition a multi-layer
governance situation. The fact that the beneﬁciaries of locally
supplied ecosystem services might be in distant locations or may
belong to different social groups creates the need for governance
systems that transcend the local realm and encompass different
geographical and governance scales, including the global level, as
demonstrated by the emerging regime for reducing carbon emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation, or REDDþ
(Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Agrawal et al., 2011). Paradoxi-
cally, however, in the case of forests, some authors have argued
that such global institutional arrangements focused on a single
service (carbon sequestration) create political incentives towards
centralized governance regimes (Sandbrook et al., 2010), thus
threatening to reverse a positive trend towards decentralization
of resource management in the developing world (Phelps et al.,
2010).
The common pool or public nature of most ecosystem services
implies that market mechanisms are not always suitable as
governance tools, since markets tend to be more effective in
dealing with private goods. The new institutional economics has
devoted considerable efforts to explaining why hybrid (i.e. inter-
mediary governance structures positioned between markets and
hierarchies) and hierarchical (either ﬁrms or states) forms of
governance emerge in situations when markets do not have a
high power of coordination. New institutional economists argue
that such situations typically occur when transaction costs are
high. Moreover, markets are not effective coordination mechan-
isms when a high level of cooperation is necessary (Williamson,
1991). This is particularly true in the case of ecosystem services
provision, which, in addition to the need for cooperation—among
users of the resource base and between them and the beneﬁci-
aries, is characterized by the high complexity of their functioning,
high levels of uncertainty, imperfect and asymmetric information
between transacting parties, and cognitive barriers in assessing
the service itself (for instance, the extent to which the service has
been supplied).
The main corollary of the arguments developed above is that
the governance of ecosystem services in a context of uncertain,
complex interactions and multiple stakeholders is best
approached in terms of nested layers. Due to the high transaction
costs involved in coordinating the transacting parties, and as
explained at length above, we expect markets to be poor govern-
ance structures for managing the provision of ecosystem services
compared to other governance regimes.3. A shift in the conceptual background of market-based
instruments
We argue that more useful insights for the management of
ecosystem services can be derived from the literature on institu-
tional arrangements for governing common-pool and public
resources than from the literature on Coasean approaches to
resolve environmental externalities. In this and the following
section, we will concentrate our discussion on payments for
Fig. 1. Relationship between different types of monetary transfers and the level of
commoditization.
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most widely used) of market-based instruments for enhancing
the provision of ecosystem services. We consider that it is
analytically more appropriate to conceptualize payments for
ecosystem services as incentives for collective action (Muradian
et al., 2010), rather than as quasi-perfect market transactions to
solve market failures (Engels et al., 2008). Such a different point of
departure has important implications, not only from a conceptual
point of view—the way the problem of ecosystem degradation is
understood and analyzed—but also in terms of policy and
practice, that is, the way conservation and rural development
interventions and policies are designed. Far from being mere
technical tools for getting the price of ecosystem services right, as
some authors have argued, payments for ecosystem services and
other so-called market-based mechanisms are above all political
instruments. PES projects, we wish to contend, are political
projects embedded in complex institutional and ecological con-
texts. The design of a PES intervention typically involves political
decisions about the users and the resource base that will be
targeted, the conditions for the payments, the amount to be paid,
and the overall goal of the policy. In democratic systems, this
normally entails a process of negotiation between concerned
parties and between different criteria. Equity and efﬁciency out-
comes are normally disputed in different ways by different actors.
McAfee and Shapiro (2010), for example, have analysed this
negotiation process in the case of the Mexican nation-wide PES
program for carbon and water-related ecosystem services. They
have found that the resulting scheme was very different from the
initial design based on propositions derived from stylized market
rationality. For example, indigenous communities were acknowl-
edged as a target group, though probably by doing so the scheme
would achieve a lower level of environmental additionality
(efﬁciency); and the incorporation of opportunity costs of eco-
system conservation became of secondary importance, though
from a market perspective this parameter should be very promi-
nent. Policy makers had to give up sticking to efﬁciency con-
siderations (as a Coasean approach would advise) when designing
the scheme. Transaction costs and social pressures from peasant
and indigenous representation moved the scheme away from its
initial market rationale. This likely reduced its economic efﬁ-
ciency, but increased its social acceptability and enhanced its role
as tool for wealth redistribution between urban and rural areas.
Such a move entailed a reduction in the level of efﬁciency
concerns (to what was originally expected), making the payment
either a reward (in case the monetary transfer has no major
effects on behaviour) or an incentive (if the transfer actually
induces a behavioural change).
Fig. 1 depicts the relationship between different types of
monetary transfers targeting the users of the resource base and
the level of commoditization. By deﬁnition, rewards have a low
level of conditionality, and therefore induce low environmental
additionality. Rewards are meant to provide social acknowledge-
ment for users of the resource base who have historically played
an important role in the provision of ecosystem services, but are
nevertheless considered poor or vulnerable rural dwellers deser-
ving compensation. This might be the case, for instance, of
Mexican indigenous groups receiving payments for the conserva-
tion of forests and other ecosystems that are not really threatened
within their territories (Rico et al., 2011; Ibarra et al., 2011).
Recipients of rewards might become examples for other users of
the resource base. Nonetheless, the downside of rewards is that
they do not contribute to avoided degradation or to improve the
conditions of the resource base. Policies with low additionality,
particularly at large scales, could induce massive misallocation of
resources, which could be otherwise used in alternative policy
goals. Rewards may hold a high degree of legitimacy, and positivespill-over effects could arise from their execution. However,
policy makers should be cautious about policies unable to
improve the condition, or, at least, avoid the further deterioration
of ecosystems.
This is why we favour PES that fall within the category of
‘‘incentives’’. In this particular context, incentives are transfers that
add ‘‘extrinsic’’ monetary considerations to other types of motiva-
tions that users of the resource base might have to enhance the
provision of ecosystem services. We assume therefore that in cases
where incentives are applied, resource users also hold intrinsic
motivations to provide ecosystem services. Incentives may how-
ever tip decisions towards a higher level of provision. Incentives
can also take the form of additional investments (the operational
costs of reforestation, fencing, the cost of adopting new technolo-
gies, infrastructure, etc.) that users of the resource base are unable
to undertake by themselves due to budgetary constraints. The
external provision of such investments may become the ‘‘tipping
point’’ in changing practices and behaviour.
The difference between incentives and markets is that incen-
tives do not cover fully the opportunity costs of more environ-
mentally-friendly practices. In the case of incentives, the level of
commoditization is not necessarily high due to the fact that
behavioural change can be induced even though the effects on
the provision of ecosystem services are not totally clear. The
difference with rewards is that incentives might actually induce a
high level of additionality, while rewards hold a low level of
additionality. Markets hold two distinctive characteristics: a high
level of commoditization (the service is clearly deﬁned) and a
high level of conditionality, two features that condition behaviour
in expected ways and that ensure a high level of additionality.
Furthermore, markets are expected to cover fully the opportunity
cost of more environmentally friendly practices. Fisher (2012)
reports a case of PES where agents assume their behaviour as
conditional to the payment (no pay, no care). The differences
between rewards, incentives and markets become clearer when
we consider the effects of discontinuing the payment. In the case
of rewards, stopping the payment would not have a signiﬁcant
effect on the provision of the services. When it comes to
incentives, discontinuing the payment would result either in no
major change in the adopted behaviour, or it would rather
backﬁre, inducing the recipients to return to the initial state
(pre-incentive behaviour or retaliation). However, in the case of
markets, ending the payment will always result in a return to the
initial state, since behavioural changes are highly conditional on
the monetary transfer.
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The large body of work on the management of common natural
resources allows us to draw lessons that can be applied to the
governance of the provision of ecosystem services. The literature on
institutions for managing the commons (all facing difﬁculties in
excluding potential users) stresses that these governance arrange-
ments tend to be more effective in solving social dilemmas when
they are built on local knowledge and trust (Ostrom, 2011a) and
when they hold high levels of involvement of stakeholders in the
design and enforcement of rules (Ostrom, 2011b), including mon-
itoring and sanctioning (Coleman, 2009). More than the general type
of governance of property rights (government, private or commu-
nity-based) what really matters is (1) how a particular institutional
arrangement ﬁts the local ecological conditions; (2) how rules are
developed and adapted across time; and (3) how social actors
perceive these arrangements in terms of legitimacy and equity
(Cole and Ostrom, 2011; Ostrom, 2011b). There is a rising empirical
evidence suggesting that natural resources are not best governed
either by private owners, whose property rights facilitate efﬁcient
market regulation of environmental issues, or by the state, on behalf
of the people. Rather, both governance structures can be either
effective or ineffective, depending on the rules they rely upon and
on how these are enforced (Ostrom and Basurto, 2011). The
conclusion from this body of literature is that the public/ private
dichotomy is overly simplistic (Ostrom, 2010). To sum up, rules and
rule-making autonomy and participation (that is, how rules are
designed and enforced, and how they evolve over time) matter more
than the property regime or the generic type of coordination
between transacting parties (Banana et al., 2007; Chhatre and
Agrawal, 2009; Cox et al., 2010; Bastakoti and Shivakoti, 2011;
Ostrom and Basurto, 2011; Persha et al., 2011).
The literature on the commons has stressed the role of sanctions.
The classiﬁcation of norms and rules for the management of common
pool resources developed by Ostrom (2010) includes ‘‘payoff rules’’,
which specify how beneﬁts and costs are to be distributed among
actors. These rules normally include penalties, taxes or labour
obligations (Ostrom and Basurto, 2011). Nevertheless, the analysis
of incentives and how they shape payoff rules have been rather
absent in this stream of literature. New insights might be derived
from incorporating considerations about the role of monetary and
non-monetary incentives (at the individual and communal levels) in
coordinating activities for the management of common pool and
public resources (i.e. ecosystem services). The widespread implemen-
tation of payments for ecosystem services and other market-based
policy instruments for enhancing the provision of ecosystem services
provide the opportunity to integrate the notion of incentives (rather
than sanctions) within the institutional analysis of social dilemmas
involving the management of natural ecosystems.4. Monetary incentives for environmental governance
Due to the difﬁculties of setting up markets for internalizing
positive environmental externalities, we have argued that we
should move from the rationale of solving environmental market
failures to creating incentives for environmental protection. Such
a shift has important implications, which we summarize below:1. A shift from solving market failures to setting up incentives for
enhancing the provision of ecosystem services reduces the
importance of economic valuation in environmental policy
design. While the point of departure for solving market failures
in the provision of ecosystem services should be the economic
valuation of the concerned services and the opportunity cost of
their supply (cost-beneﬁt analysis), the point of departure forsetting up incentives for environmental protection is to deﬁne a
common social goal. That is, the practices among the users of the
resource base that are meant to be promoted. As stated above,
usually there are considerable uncertainties about the relation-
ship between land use practices and the provision of ecosystem
services. However, the potential gains or the level of threat to the
resource base might be sufﬁciently high to justify a precaution-
ary approach. Namely, the need to act despite the uncertainties.
Besides a precautionary vision, the conceptual framework of safe
minimum standards can also provide possible guiding principles
for the deﬁnition of policy goals. As argued above, in practice, the
deﬁnition of common social goals are not driven exclusively by
considerations of market efﬁciency. Equity concerns, and the
pressure of particular groups, can be very important.2. The well functioning of markets requires, among other things,
good information. In the case of ecosystem services, this
information mainly refers to the relationship between the
use of the resource base, the provision of services and human
welfare. However, a shift of emphasis towards the design of
incentives requires paying attention to other types of informa-
tion, namely how agents respond to incentives.3. In particular, the design of incentives requires a good under-
standing of how they affect different kinds of motivations.
There is abundant evidence that external monetary incentives,
under particular circumstances, could crowd out intrinsic moti-
vations to undertake a particular activity, especially if such
activity has to do with pro-social behaviour (Bowles, 2008).4. Furthermore, the design of incentives also requires under-
standing the possible effects across time scales. Incentives
often induce different behavioural changes in the short-run, as
compared to the long-term (Gneezy et al., 2011), particularly
when they are removed.
The use of experimental approaches to assess the behavioural
effects of incentives is on the rise. Though scattered, the evidence
gathered so far (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Bowles,
2008; Charness and Gneezy, 2009; Lacetera and Macis, 2010)
suggests that the behavioural outcomes of incentives are particu-
larly dependent on three factors: the nature of motivations; the
psychological and social meanings attached to particular types of
behaviour; and, ﬁnally, the choice of vehicle for delivering incen-
tives (i.e. whether they are monetary, in kind, collective or
individual). The probability that incentives are ineffective or back-
ﬁre is higher when: (a) the concerned tasks or behavioural habits
have an important pro-social component (e.g. contributions to the
common good, altruistic or collaborative behaviour); (b) intrinsic
motivations are salient; (c) the importance of civic values and
social norms on decisions is high; and (d) rewards are monetary
(especially when they are relatively low). Payments for ecosystem
services and other market-based policy mechanisms tend to be
applied in situations that meet these conditions. The chances that
they are ineffective or even backﬁre (particularly when the pay-
ments are discontinued) may be considerable. However, more
research is needed in this ﬁeld, in order to improve our under-
standing of the links between incentives and individual behaviour
in the context of environmental stewardship, particularly in
collective action situations. We need to enhance our knowledge
about how incentives may induce changes in the rules governing
collective action in the management of natural resources.5. The challenge of multi-layered and hybrid governance
regimes
The collective action dilemmas typically faced when dealing
with the provision of ecosystem services do not only occur at the
R. Muradian, L. Rival / Ecosystem Services 1 (2012) 93–100 99level of the resource base (especially if it is commonly owned) but
also between the users of the resource base and the beneﬁciaries
of the services. This implies that the governance of ecosystem
services is characteristically multi-layered. Multi-level govern-
ance systems entail a complex architecture involving a multi-
plicity of actors and many interrelations between the ‘local’ and
the ‘global.’ The resulting problems of regulation and enforcement
at different levels are challenging. Solving such problems nor-
mally requires that we move from thinking in terms of single,
ideal managerial approaches (e.g. command-and-control, markets
or community-based management) to combining governance
structures, scales and tools. Management decisions regarding
public and common pool goods require that higher-level institu-
tions and organizations be recognized as legitimate (Eckersley,
2004). Nonetheless, without appropriate incentives or local
engagement in rule making, there is abundant evidence that state
policies might be ineffective. As McGinnis (2000) has argued,
governance does not require a single centre of power, and
governments should not claim an exclusive responsibility for
resolving political issues.
The recent rise in the policy agenda of market-based mechan-
isms for environmental governance has shifted the emphasis from
getting the right governmental regulation for conservation to
getting the right price for ecosystem services. We call for a new
way of addressing the challenges of environmental governance,
away from this false dichotomy. What is needed instead is that
proper attention be paid to getting the right set of rules and
instruments, along multiple governance layers. Nested (poly-
centric) institutions have a role to play in the complex environ-
mental governance systems involved in the provision of
ecosystem services, and central governments have been shown
to be increasingly called upon to engage with other social actors
to ensure the emergence and well functioning of such arrange-
ments (Muradian and Rival, in press).
To conclude, we would like to stress that economic incentives
may, under speciﬁc circumstances, contribute to improving the
governance regimes of natural ecosystems. However, we must
also put the necessary attention in their design, and ensure both
their particular ﬁt within speciﬁc socio-economic contexts and
their capacity to modify rule-making structures. These two
aspects are determinant when it comes to both effectiveness
and social acceptability. At the end of the day, there is no escaping
the old concern for the suitability of rules, including by whom and
for whom they are made. In other words, there is always a need to
pay attention to political choices. As it is being demonstrated by
current debates around the implementation of REDDþ policies,
multilevel governance of ecosystem goods and services induces
not only new ways of doing economics, but also new forms of
political theory and political action. Multilevel governance geared
to protect the commons through enhanced cooperation holds
the promise of redeﬁning justice, recognition, redistribution,
power, democracy, citizenship, the state, and many other political
categories.References
Agrawal, A., Nepstad, D., Chhatre, A., 2011. Reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation. Annual Review of Environmental and Resources 36,
373–396.
Amsworth, P., Chan, K., Daily, G., Ehrlich, P., Kremen, C., Ricketts, T., Sanjayan, M.,
2007. Ecosystem-service science and the way forward for conservation.
Conservation Biology 21 (6), 1383–1384.
Arsel, M, Buscher, B., 2012. NatureTM Inc.: Changes and continuities in neoliberal
conservation and market-based environmental policy. Development and
Change 43 (1), 53–78.
Banana, A., Vogt, N., Bahati, J., Gombya-Ssembajjwe, W., 2007. Decentralized
governance and ecological health: Why local institutions fail to moderatedeforestation in Mpigi district of Uganda. Scientiﬁc Research and Essay 2 (10),
434–445.
Bastakoti, R., Shivakoti, G., 2011. Rules and collective action: An institutional
analysis of the performance of irrigation systems in Nepal. Journal of Institu-
tional Economics 7, 1–12.
Bowles, S., 2008. Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine ‘‘the
moral sentiments’’ evidence from economic experiments. Science 320,
1605–1609.
Brouwer, R., Tesfaye, A., Pauw, P., 2011. Meta-analysis of institutional-economic
factors explaining the environmental performance of payments for watershed
services. Environmental Conservation 38 (4), 380–392.
Bruijnzeel, L.A., 2004. Hydrological functions of tropical forests: not seeing the soil
for the trees? Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 104, 185–228.
Chapin, S.F., Koﬁnas, G.P., Folke, C., 2009. Principles of ecosystem stewardship.
Resilience-based natural resource management in a changing world. Springer,
London.
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., 2009. Incentives to exercise. Econometrica 77 (3),
909–931.
Cole, D., Ostrom, E., 2011. The Variety of Property Systems and Rights in Natural
Resources. In: Cole, D., Ostrom, E. (Eds.), Property in Land and Other Resources.
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA, pp. 37–64.
Chhatre, A., Agrawal, A., 2009. Trade-offs and synergies between carbon storage
and livelihood beneﬁts from forest commons. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 106 (42), 17667–17670.
Coleman, E., 2009. Institutional factors affecting biophysical outcomes in forest
management. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 28 (1), 122–146.
Corbera, E., Schroeder, H., 2011. Governing and implementing REDDþ . Environ-
mental Science and Policy 14, 89–99.
Costanza, R., 2008. Ecosystem services: Multiple classiﬁcation systems are needed.
Biological Conservation 141, 350–353.
Cowx, I., Portocarrero-Aya, M., 2011. Paradigm shifts in ﬁsh conservation: Moving
to the ecosystem services concept. Journal of Fish Biology 79, 1663–1680.
Cox, M., Arnold, G., Villamayor-Tomas, S., 2010. A review of design principles for
community-based natural resource management. Ecology and Society 15 (4), 38.
Eckersley, R., 2004. Green State. Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty. MIT,
Cambridge.
Engel, S., Pagiola, S., Wunder, S., 2008. Designing payments for environmental
services in theory and practice: an overview of the issues. Ecological Econom-
ics 62, 663–674.
Estes, J., Terborgh, J., Brashares, J., Power, M., Berger, J., Bond, W., Carpenter, S.,
Essington, T., Holt, R., Jackson, J., Marquis, R., Oksanen, L., Oksanen, T., 2011.
Trophic downgrading of planet earth. Science 333, 301–306.
Farley, K., Anderson, W., Bremer, L., Harden, C., 2011. Compensation for ecosystem
services: An evaluation of efforts to achieve conservation and development in
Ecuadorian paramo grasslands. Environmental Conservation 38 (4), 393–405.
Farley, J., Costanza, R., 2010. Payments for ecosystem services: From local to
global. Ecological Economics 69, 2060–2068.
Fehr, E., Falk, A., 2002. Psychological foundations of incentives. European Eco-
nomic Review 46, 687–724.
Fisher, J., 2012. No pay, no care? A case study exploring motivations for
participation in payments for ecosystem services in Uganda. Oryx 46 (1),
45–54.
Fisher, B., Turner, K., 2008. Ecosystem services: Classiﬁcation for valuation.
Biological Conservation 141, 1167–1170.
Frey, B., Jegen, R., 2001. Motivation crowding theory. Journal of Economic Surveys
15 (5), 589–611.
Gneezy, U., Meier, S., Rey-Biel, P., 2011. When and why incentives (don’t) work to
modify behavior. Journal of Economic Perspectives 25 (4), 191–210.
Go´mez-Baggethun, E., de Groot, R., Lomas, P.L., Montes, C., 2010. The history of
ecosystem services in economic theory and practice: From early notions to
markets and payment schemes. Ecological Economics 69 (6), 1209–1218.
Go´mez-Baggethun, E., Kelemens, E., 2008. Linking institutional change and the
ﬂows of ecosystem services: Case studies from Spain and Hungary. In:
Kluva´nkova´-Oravska´, T., Chobotova, V., Jı´lkova´, J. (Eds.), Institutional Analysis
of Sustainability Problems, Slovak Academy of Sciences, pp. 118–145.
Go´mez-Baggethun, E., Ruiz-Perez, M., 2011. Economic valuation and the commo-
diﬁcation of ecosystem services. Progress in Physical Geography 35 (5),
613–628.
Holling, C.S., 2010. The Resilience of Terrestial Ecosystems. In: Gunderson, L, Allen, C.,
Holling, C.S. (Eds.), Foundations of Ecological Resilience. Island Press, U.S.,
pp. 67–110, pp.
Ibarra, J.T., Barreau, A., Del Campo, C., Camacho, C.I., Martin, G.J., McCandless, S.R.,
2011. When formal and market-based conservation mechanisms disrupt food
sovereignty: impacts of community conservation and payments for environ-
mental services on an indigenous community of Oaxaca, Mexico. International
Forestry Review 13 (3), 318–337.
Jackson, R., Jobbagy, E., Avissar, R., Roy, S.B., Barret, D., Cook, C., Farley, K., le Maitre,
D., McCarl, B., Murray, B., 2005. Trading water for carbon with biological
carbon sequestration. Science 310, 1944–1947.
Kanowski, J., Catterall, C., 2010. Carbon stocks in above-ground biomass
of monoculture plantations, mixed species plantations and environmental
restoration plantings in north-east Australia. Ecological Management and
Restoration 11 (2), 119–126.
Kumar, P. (Ed.), Earthscan, London.
R. Muradian, L. Rival / Ecosystem Services 1 (2012) 93–100100Lacetera, N., Macis, M., 2010. Do all material incentives for pro-social activities
backﬁre? The response to cash and non-cash incentives for blood donations.
Journal of Economic Psychology 31, 738–748.
MA (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment), 2005. Ecosystems and human well-being:
A synthesis. Island Press, Washington, D.C..
McAfee, K., 2012. The Contradictory Logic of Global Ecosystem Services Markets.
Development and Change 43 (1), 105–131.
McAfee, K., Shapiro, E., 2010. Payments for ecosystem services in Mexico: Nature,
neoliberalism, social movements and the state. Annals of the Association of
American Geographies 100 (3), 579–599.
McGinnis, M.D. (Ed.), The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Muradian, R., Corbera, E., Pascual, U., Kosoy, N., May, P., 2010. Reconciling theory
and practice: An alternative conceptual framework for understanding pay-
ments for ecosystem services. Ecological Economics 69, 1202–1208.
Muradian, R. and L. Rival (Eds). In press. Governing the Provision of Ecosystem
Services. Springer. The Netherlands.
Noss, R.F., Cooperrider, A., 1994. Saving nature’s legacy: protecting and restoring
biodiversity. Island Press, Washington, D.C..
Ostrom, E., 2010. Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex
economic systems. American Economics Review 100 (3), 641–672.
Ostrom, E., 2011a. Reﬂections on ‘‘some unsettled problems of irrigation’’.
American Economic Review 101 (1), 49–63.
Ostrom, E., 2011b. Why do we need to protect institutional diversity? European
Policy Science, 1–20.
Ostrom, E., Basurto, X., 2011. Crafting analytical tools to study institutional
change. Journal of Institutional Economics 7 (3), 317–343.
Panayotou, T., 1993. Green markets: The economics of sustainable development.
ICS Press, San Francisco.
Persha, L., Agrawal, A., Chhatre, A., 2011. Social and ecological synergy: Local
rulemaking, forest livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. Science 331,
1606–1608.
Phelps, J., Webb, E., Agrawal, A, 2010. Does REDDþ threaten to recentralize forest
governance? Science 328, 312–313.
Putz, F.E., Redford, K.H., 2009. Dangers of carbon-based conservation. Global
Environmental Change 19, 400–401.Rico, L., Ruiz-Pe´rez, M., Reyes, F., Barrasa-Garcı´a, S., Contreras-Mejia, E., 2011.
Efﬁciency of Payments for Environmental Services: Equity and additionality in
a case study from a Biosphere Reserve in Chiapas, Mexico. Ecological
Economics 70, 2361–2368.
Rodriguez, J.P, Beard, T.D., Bennett, E., Cumming, G., Cork, S., Agard, J., Dobson, A.,
Peterson, G., 2006. Trade-offs across space, time, and ecosystem services.
Ecology and Society 11 (1), 28.
Sachs, J., et al., 2009. Biodiversity conservation and the Millenium Development
Goals. Science 325 (5947), 1502–1503.
Sanchez-Azofeifa, A., Pfaff, J., Robalino, Boomhower, J., 2007. Costa Rica’s Payment
for Environmental Services Program: Intention, Implementation and Impact.
Conservation Biology 21 (5), 1165–1173.
Sandbrook, C., Nelson, F., Adams, W., Agrawal, A., 2010. Carbon, forests and the
REDD paradox. Oryx 44 (3), 330–334.
Sierra, R., Russman, E., E., 2006. On the efﬁciency of environmental service
payments: A forest conservation assessment in the Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica.
Ecological Economics 59, 131–141.
Skroch., M., Lopez-Hoffman, L., 2009. Saving nature under the big tent of
ecosystem services: A response to Adams and Redford. Conservation Biology
24 (1), 325–327.
Sunderland, T., Ehringhaus, C., Campbell, B., 2008. Conservation and development
in tropical forest landscapes: A time to face the trade-offs? Environmental
Conservation 34 (4), 276–279.
Tallis, H., Goldman, R., Uhl, M., Brosi, B., 2009. Integrating conservation and
development in the ﬁeld: implementing ecosystem service projects. Frontiers
in Ecology and the Environment 7 (1), 12–20.
Tallis, H., Kareiva, P., Marvier, M., Chang, A.. 2008. An ecosystem services frame-
work to support both practical conservation and economic development. In:
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (28): pp. 9457–9464.
Wallace, K.J., 2007. Classiﬁcation of ecosystem services: Problems and solutions.
Biological Conservation 139, 235–246.
Williamson, O., 1991. Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete
structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 36 (2), 269–296.
Wilson, J., 2006. Matching social and ecological systems in complex ocean
ﬁsheries. Ecology and Society 11 (1), 9.
